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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the entry of MCI into the long-distance
market in 1969, AT&T supplied virtually all long-
distance calling in the United States, as well as the
predominant share of local exchange services. Ac-
cordingly, AT&T was subjected to traditional mo-
nopoly regulation by both federal and state regula-
* Torchmark Professor of Economics, Auburn University.
Ph.D., Economics, University of Florida, 1976.
** Professor of Economics, University of Tennessee, Ph.D.,
Economics, Washington University, 1982. An earlier version of
this article was submitted by AT&T to the Federal Communica-
tions Commission on June 12, 1995, as an ex parte presentation
in CC Docket No. 79-252.
1 In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Notice
of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979);
First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980); Second Report
and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982); Order on Recon., 93
F.C.C.2d 54 (1983); Policy Statement and Third Report and
Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1983); Fourth Report and Order,
95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983), vacated and remanded, AT&T v.
FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
3020 (1993); Fifth Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984);
Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985), vacated and
tory authorities. As the number of interexchange
carriers grew, however, the question of whether and
how these new entrants into the long-distance mar-
ket should be regulated arose. In 1980, in the Com-
petitive Carrier Proceeding,' the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")
resolved the issue by adopting a policy which classi-
fied firms according to their ability to adversely af-
remanded, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d
1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Pro-
ceeding]. AT&T filed a motion in this docket to have its classifi-
cation changed from a dominant carrier to a non-dominant car-
rier. Motion for Reclassification of AT&T as a Nondominant
Carrier, in CC Dkt. No. 79-252 (Sept. 22, 1993); Ex Parte
Presentation in Support of AT&T's Motion for Reclassification
as a Non-Dominant Carrier, in CC Dkt. No. 79-252 (Apr. 24,
1995) [hereinafter Ex Parte Presentation] (reasserting the mo-
tion). On October 12, 1995, the FCC decided that it would now
treat AT&T as a nondominant carrier for regulatory purposes.
In re Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dom-
inant Carrier, Order, in CC Dkt. No. 79-252, FCC 95-427
(Oct. 23, 1995) [hereinafter AT&T Non-Dominant Order]. See
also Doug Abrahms, FCC Frees AT&T from Some Restric-
tions, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at B8; Ruling Makes Phone
Rivalry Keener, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 13, 1995, at B-1.
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fect market prices.' Specifically, firms with signifi-
cant market power were to be classified as
"dominant," while firms without such power were to
be classified as "nondominant." Of particular impor-
tance, considerably more regulatory oversight and
controls were imposed on any firms judged to be
"dominant."'
When the FCC adopted this "dominant firm" sys-
tem of regulation, AT&T was one of a very small
number of long-distance firms competing in the
United States. It supplied over ninety percent of the
long-distance traffic, owned or operated nearly 100
percent of the transmission facilities used to carry
long-distance calls, and enjoyed a unique dialing ad-
vantage over other long-distance competitors. Most
importantly, in 1980, AT&T maintained control
over the local exchange bottleneck facilities through
which virtually all long-distance calls pass. In light
of these market conditions, the FCC chose to classify
AT&T as a dominant firm and put in place a regu-
latory apparatus designed to control the exercise of
AT&T's perceived market power.
Today's long-distance market is vastly different
from that of fifteen years ago. The 1984 divestiture
of the Bell operating companies eliminated AT&T's
control of local exchange bottleneck facilities.'
AT&T is now one of over 450 interexchange compa-
nies vying for the patronage of long-distance custom-
ers.' Moreover, as the number of competitors has
grown, AT&T's share of long-distance transmission
' Competitive Carrier Proceeding, First Report and Order,
supra note 1.
' The general policy of applying different regulatory con-
straints to firms competing within the same market is known as
"asymmetric regulation" and has been the subject of some criti-
cism. See, e.g., FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER 14, IMPLICATIONS
OF ASYMMETRIC REGULATION FOR COMPETITION POLICY
ANALYSIS (authored by John R. Haring) (1984); David L.
Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Market Based Regulation of a
Quasi-Monopoly: A Transition Policy for Telecommunications,
15 POL'Y STUD. J. 395 (1987). Asymmetric regulatory controls
over the "dominant" firm have continued until very recently,
even though traditional rate-of-return regulation of AT&T was
replaced by price cap regulation in 1989. In re Policies and
Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Report and Or-
der and Second Further Notice, 4 FCC Rcd. 2873 (1989), re-
considered, 6 FCC Rcd. 665 (1991), remanded sub. nom.
AT&T v. FCC, 974 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Thus, the
change to price cap regulation did not signal an end to asymmet-
ric regulation.
" See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aftd sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
1 FCC, CC, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS Div., TRENDS IN TELE-
PHONE SERVICE (1995) [hereinafter TELEPHONE TRENDS].
1 FCC, CC, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DIV., FIBER DEPLOY-
capacity has shrunk to some forty to forty-five per-
cent,6 while its share of interstate minutes-of-use has
fallen to fifty-eight percent. Indeed, MCI, Sprint
and LDDS/Wiltel now have sufficient capacity in
place to absorb thirty-two percent of AT&T's re-
maining share of the market within three months.'
The degree and intensity of rivalry among long-dis-
tance firms also has increased commensurate with
the growth of competitors in the long-distance mar-
ket. In 1994, a typical American household received
some 330 advertising contacts from long-distance
companies.' The result of this heightened rivalry has
been falling prices, improved quality, and an ever-
expanding choice of innovative long-distance services.
Due to these changes in the long-distance market,
the FCC has reclassified AT&T as a nondominant
carrier. This reclassification, however, does not com-
pletely eradicate asymmetric regulation. Though the
FCC declared that it was not the determinative con-
sideration, AT&T has agreed to be bound by several
residual controls which do not apply to its competi-
tors.1" For example, AT&T will provide a fifteen
percent discount to low-income consumers for a pe-
riod of three years." Other constraints were negoti-
ated for low-volume residential customers and for
800 directory assistance service. 2 AT&T is also re-
quired to notify the Commission five days in advance
of residential rate increases above certain levels." In
addition, the Commission declined to extend the non-
dominant classification to AT&T's international ser-
MENT UPDATE, END OF YEAR 1993 (1994) [hereinafter FIBER
DEPLOYMENT UPDATE].
7 FCC, CC, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DIv., LONG DISTANCE
MARKET SHARES: FIRST QUARTER 1995 Tbl. 3 (1995) [herein-
after MARKET SHARES].
o T.L. Brand et al., An Updated Study of AT&T's Compet-
itors Capacity to Absorb Rapid Demand Growth, in Ex Parte
Presentation, supra note 1, Att. B.
" Letter from C.L. Ward, AT&T, to William F. Caton,
Acting Secretary, FCC, in CC Dkt. Nos. 79-252, 93-197, and
80-286 (Mar. 9, 1995), in Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 1,
Att. S.
10 AT&T Non-Dominant Order, supra note 1, para. 37.
AT&T suggested these "voluntary" commitments in a series of
ex parte letters to the Commission. See Letter from R. Gerard
Salemme, Vice President of Governmental Affairs, AT&T, to
Kathleen M.H. Wallman, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau,
FCC, in CC Dkt. No. 79-252 (Sept. 21, 1995); Letter from R.
Gerard Salemme, V.P.-Gov. Affairs, AT&T, to Kathleen M.H.
Wallman, Chief, CC, FCC, in CC Dkt. No. 79-252 (Oct. 5,
1995).
" AT&T Non-Dominant Order, supra note 1, para. 84.
Is For example, low-volume residential customers will have
a guaranteed rate, set at three dollars per month for the first 20
minutes of service during the first year. Id. para. 85.
is Id. para. 86.
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vices.14 Further, fifteen state regulatory commissions
still continue to employ asymmetric regulation of
intrastate long-distance calling." Thus, while it
appears that asymmetric regulation of AT&T has
ended, in fact it has not quite yet.
In light of these developments, it is appropriate, if
not long overdue, to examine the issue of whether
AT&T should continue to be subjected to any form
of asymmetric regulation by the FCC or state regu-
latory commissions. Our purpose, then, is to examine
whether AT&T has market power in today's market
and whether any economic rationale exists for regu-
lating AT&T's services differentially from its com-
petitors. This examination is greatly facilitated by
the publication of several empirical studies of the
post-divestiture long-distance market and by a
wealth of evidence that has accumulated at the state
level over the past decade as individual state regula-
tory commissions have introduced more relaxed reg-
ulation and eliminated asymmetric regulatory poli-
cies. In this article, we will draw heavily upon both
of these important sources of information.
Our approach is three-pronged. First, relying on
the conventional tools of industrial organization/an-
titrust analysis, we assess whether AT&T has suffi-
cient unilateral market power to warrant its contin-
ued classification as "dominant." Second, we review
a complementary body of direct and indirect empiri-
cal evidence pertaining to the question of AT&T's
market power. Finally, we examine a set of miscella-
neous "competitive" issues that surround the ques-
tion of "dominance." These issues initially arose at
the state level and, for the most part, were resolved
as many states have now moved to end asymmetric
regulation in their long-distance markets.
On the basis of this analysis, as well as the other
evidence examined herein, this paper concludes that
AT&T does not possess the control over pricing or
competitors that initially gave rise to its classification
as a "dominant" carrier. As a result, neither con-
sumers nor the tax-paying public are well served by
the perpetuation of asymmetric dominant firm regu-
14 Id. para. 2. The Commission is also poised to begin a new
proceeding on the entire interexchange marketplace to determine
appropriate industry-wide regulation. Id. Thus, despite the sig-
nificance of this Commission action, it remains to be seen
whether it will lead to true deregulation of the interexchange
market.
" The FCC has lagged behind many state regulatory com-
missions in eliminating asymmetric regulation of long-distance
carriers, as currently 35 states regulate all interexchange carriers
equally. Letter from Alex J. Mandl, Exec. V.P., AT&T, to the
Hon. Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, FCC (Nov. 17, 1994), in Ex
Parte Presentation; supra note 1, Att. U (Status of Regulatory
lation of AT&T. Specifically, an examination of
standard market power criteria used in antitrust
analyses provides compelling evidence that AT&T
does not possess significant market power but,
rather, faces effective competition from both existing
and potential competitors. Moreover, an abundant
amount of evidence drawn from other independent
analyses of this market, as well as state and federal
experimentation with relaxed regulation, provide
further corroboration that AT&T faces effective
competition. Finally, an examination of several aux-
iliary issues that have periodically surfaced regard-
ing the merits of relaxed regulation reveal that the
regulatory commissions can safely and confidently
remove the dominant firm regulation governing
AT&T.
II. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR
TRADITIONAL REGULATION AND THE
CRITERIA FOR RELAXED REGULATION
The entire post-divestiture period has been char-
acterized by asymmetric regulation of AT&T at the
federal level, on the grounds that it is "dominant."
All other interexchange carriers are classified as
"nondominant." 6 In order for the FCC (or any reg-
ulatory agency) to establish and maintain the "domi-
nant" classification of a firm, it is necessary first to
define what is meant by this term. Economically, a
firm is considered to be dominant if it possesses sig-
nificant monopoly power.17  Alternatively, a
nondominant firm can be said to be subject to effec-
tive competition.
This economic definition is entirely consistent with
the regulatory definition of dominance first adopted
by the FCC in 1980 in the Competitive Carrier Pro-
ceeding. The FCC stated that a dominant firm is one
with "substantial opportunity and incentive to subsi-
dize the rates for more competitive services with rev-
enues obtained from its monopoly or near-monopoly
services."1 8 The order further said that a nondomi-
nant firm is one without sufficient market power to
Rules and Regulations of AT&T by Jurisdiction). Of these
states, only three continue to regulate AT&T's earnings. Id.
Thus, while 32 states have already implemented symmetric reg-
ulation without earnings constraints, AT&T is still hampered in
substantial portions of the country. Id.
"' Competitive Carrier Proceeding, First Report and Order,
supra note 1, para. 27.
17 See generally F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1980).
" Competitive Carrier Proceeding, First Report and Order,
supra note 1, para. 15 (emphasis added). The Commission also
noted that a carrier would be classified as "dominant if it has
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"sustain prices either unreasonably above or below
costs."' 9 Thus, the concept of market power provides
the cornerstone of the FCC's classification system.
The question then, is how to determine whether a
firm possesses a significant amount of market
power.2" A prerequisite to analyzing market power
is to define the relevant market for the firm's product
or products. If markets are defined either too broadly
or too narrowly, it is likely that the standard market
power criteria will provide misleading information.2
The market definition process requires the delinea-
tion of a set of boundaries in both geographic and
product space within which the market price is de-
termined. A relevant market is a set of buyers and
sellers whose purchase and production decisions es-
tablish the price at which the product or service is
sold.
The economic criteria used to delineate market
boundaries are built upon product and geographic
substitutability on both the demand and supply sides
of the market. 2 In general, the greater the degree of
supply-side or demand-side substitutability, the
broader the relevant market.2" In the case of long-
distance telecommunications, the high degree of sup-
ply-side substitutability across services indicates that
the relevant product market includes all inter-
exchange toll services. Firms currently providing any
one of the toll services (e.g., Message Telephone Ser-
vice ("MTS")) could very easily begin to provide
other toll services (e.g., Wide Area Telephone Ser-
vice ("WATS")). Thus, the relevant product market
to examine, and upon which to base policy, is the set
of all interexchange services.
2 4
Similarly, the high degree of substitutability of
vendors across geographic regions indicates that, as
acknowledged by the FCC, the relevant geographic
market encompasses the entire United States. 25 This
determination is underscored by the fact that inter-
exchange carriers with a point-of-presence ("POP")
market power (i.e. power to control price)." Id. para. 26.
19 Id.
20 This question, of course, has a long tradition in the eco-
nomics of antitrust. For a more detailed discussion of the eco-
nomics of monopoly power and effective competition see DAVID
L. KASERMAN & JOHN W. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND Busi-
NESS: THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION ch. 4
(1995).
"' Although the market definition issue is one that can lead
to errors in market power analysis, it is conceptually possible to
err in the market definition analysis and still perform an evalua-
tion of market power that yields correct outcomes. See William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981). As a practical matter,
however, one is far more likely to get the economics right if the
in any local access transport area ("LATA") may
supply originating service to any end office in that
LATA by ordering access from the local exchange
company. Accordingly, market coverage extends
across both urban and rural areas, all of which are
accessible simply by purchasing local exchange com-
pany access. Application of the standard economic
criteria used to delineate market boundaries leads to
the conclusion that the relevant market is all inter-
exchange services sold in the United States.
This finding is extremely important for regulatory
purposes. Where regulatory policy is founded upon
the intensity of competition within the regulated
firm's market or markets, determination of the cor-
rect market boundaries becomes crucial for two rea-
sons. First, as noted above, market definition is a
prerequisite to an accurate evaluation of market
power. An inaccurate conclusion regarding market
power is likely to result if an inaccurate market defi-
nition is employed. Erring in the direction of defin-
ing the market too narrowly generally tends to bias
the analysis toward a finding of significant market
power. An overly narrow market definition can re-
sult in an unwarranted conclusion that substantial
market power is present.
Second, whether the regulated firm operates
within a single market or multiple markets deter-
mines whether regulatory constraints should apply to
the firm's overall operations or be tailored to those
subsets of the firm's outputs that constitute separate
markets. Where the firm sells its output within a
single overall product market, a policy that applies
different regulatory policies to different services
within that market can have serious adverse conse-
quences. Specifically, regulating one part of a market
differently from other parts of the same market can
distort market signals and create opportunities for
strategic and inefficient uses of regulatory authority
by competitors.2
market is correctly defined.
22 For a more detailed discussion of the market definition
exercise see KASERMAN & MAYO, supra note 20, at 111-16.
2" Because substitutability on either side of the market will
significantly influence the price that is established, market
boundaries are determined by the greatest degree of sub-
stitutability found - whether it is on the demand side or the
supply side of the market.
24 For an example of the wide acceptance of this broad prod-
uct market definition see Competitive Carrier Proceeding,
Fourth Report and Order, supra note 1, para. 13 (stating that
"interstate, domestic interexchange telecommunications services
comprise the relevant product market").
25 Id.
26 For a discussion on the strategic use of antitrust concerns
[Vol. 4
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Once the relevant market has been determined,
three fundamental factors are typically used to eval-
uate the extent to which any given firm in that mar-
ket is subject to effective competition: the supply re-
sponsiveness (or elasticity) of other firms, market
demand characteristics, and market share character-
istics. Indeed, both academic literature and public
policy bodies have widely acknowledged the rele-
vance of these criteria in the assessment of market
power.27 Information on these three factors allows
policymakers to reach informed judgments regarding
the extent of competition in the market. As competi-
tion emerges, the need for traditional regulation
wanes and, where effective competition is found to
exist, a complete elimination of direct regulation is
warranted. 8 In the paragraphs that follow, we
briefly examine the role each of these economic char-
acteristics plays in determining whether a firm pos-
sesses significant market power.
First, consider the role of the supply elasticity of
competing firms. Any firm contemplating a price in-
crease above the competitive level must consider the
extent to which such an increase will encourage in-
creased sales by its competitors. Business lost to these
other firms will exert downward pressure on market
price, thereby reducing (or, in some cases, completely
eliminating or even reversing) the potential gains
from the contemplated price increase. Thus, in a
market where other firms can promptly meet cus-
tomer demand by expanding their service availability
in response to a competitor's price increase, every
firm faces effective competition because any attempt
to increase price to supra-competitive leels will be
defeated by a substantial loss of sales to competitors.
Just as a firm must consider the supply response
of firms already in the market, it must also consider
the response of firms that are not currently providing
service to this market but which could begin serving
it if additional profit incentives were created by an
increase in the market price.29 Incumbent producers
must recognize the response of potential competitors
as well as current competitors in evaluating their
ability to raise prices. As a result, in situations
to hamper competitive market processes see William J. Baumol
& Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition,
28 J. L. & EcoN. 247, 257-58 (1985).
7 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 938-63;
Simran K. Kahai, David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Is the
Dominant Firm Dominant? An Empirical Analysis of AT&T's
Market Power,- J. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 1996). See also
In re Revisions to Price Cap Rules for AT&T Corp., Report
and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 3009, para. 16 (1995) [hereinafter
AT&T Price Cap Order] (applying these same criteria to the
case of commercial long-distance services).
where new firms can readily enter the market and
capture sales, other firms' supply responsiveness to
price changes may be quite high even if there is a
limited number of firms currently serving the mar-
ket.80 Incumbent suppliers still face effective compe-
tition in this situation because any attempt to raise
prices above the competitive level will result in the
entry of additional firms with a corresponding in-
crease in supply. Thus, an assessment of entry and
expansion conditions in the relevant market is a crit-
ical part of the overall assessment of competition in a
market.
Second, market demand characteristics play an
important role in determining the market power of a
firm. At the most basic level, the price elasticity of
total market demand affects the extent of any firm's
market power. Specifically, the more elastic the mar-
ket demand, the more consumers view other goods
and services (or reduced purchases of the service in
question) as viable alternatives. As a result, a highly
elastic market demand will limit substantially the
extent of any firm's market power. Attempts to in-
crease price will result in significant losses in sales as
consumers switch to substitute goods or services or
simply purchase fewer units.
In addition to market demand elasticity, three
other characteristics of demand help to determine
whether a given firm possesses market power: mar-
ket growth, the distribution of demand, and the will-
ingness of consumers to switch suppliers. First,
ceteris paribus, growing markets are more likely to
attract entry than stagnant or declining markets.8
Market growth reduces the likelihood of firm fail-
ures, and in turn lessens potential entrants' vulnera-
bility. The heightened threat of entry and expansion
in rapidly growing markets thus acts to restrict in-
cumbent firms' ability to raise prices to above-com-
petitive levels.
3 2
Next, in markets with a highly skewed demand
distribution (i.e., a small proportion of customers ac-
counts for a large portion of total demand), firms
with high market shares have fewer opportunities to
engage in supra-competitive pricing, because the rel-
IS Indirect regulation in the form of constraints provided by
antitrust laws, of course, remains.
" Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 938-63.
80 Id. at 950.
8 See, e.g., J.C. Hause & G. Du Rietz, Entry, Industry
Growth and the Microdynamics of Industry Supply, 92 J. POL.
EcoN. 733, 734-47 (1984).
"" Note, though, that rapidly expanding demand may exert
upward pressure on prices in the most competitive of markets.
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS ch. 5 (1993).
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atively few customers that account for a large share
of the business being generated have a strong incen-
tive to seek out alternative suppliers if their current
provider raises prices. 8 The fear of losing a signifi-
cant amount of business drives firms to charge com-
petitive prices to these large customers, who, them-
selves may become competitors through resale.
Similarly, a relatively skewed demand sends impor-
tant signals to the various competitors that rapid
market share gains (losses) are possible through effi-
cient (inefficient) performance and pricing. This
heightened vulnerability reduces incumbent firms'
market power and lowers the likelihood that they
would exercise any residual market power they
might possess.
The willingness or reluctance of consumers to
switch vendors of a good or service is also a funda-
mental consideration in analyzing a firm's ability to
raise prices to supra-competitive levels. When a
given firm's customers are relatively unwilling or
unable to switch suppliers regardless of price, the
firm in question has more latitude to raise price to
the detriment of consumers. Alternatively, if consum-
ers are willing and able to switch vendors, a firm
will have considerably less latitude to unilaterally
raise prices above competitive levels.
The third set of criteria traditionally used to ex-
amine market power revolve around market share.
Ceteris paribus, a firm with a large market share
could, by withholding some given portion of its out-
put from the market, have a larger impact on total
market supply and, hence, price than a firm with a
small market share."' The measurement and inter-
pretation of market share for the interexchange in-
dustry, however, must be approached with caution.
The level and time path of AT&T's market share
reflect not only normal marketplace developments
but also the fact that AT&T was "endowed" with a
very high market share at the time of the divesti-
For empirical evidence that buyer concentration tends to
promote more competitive pricing see Steven H. Lustgarten, The
Impact of Buyer Concentration in Manufacturing Industries, 57
REV. EcON. & STAT. 125 (1975); Peter R. Cowley, Business
Margins and Buyer/Seller Power, 68 REV. EcON. & STAT. 333
(1986).
"" Whether such withholding of supply by a single firm will
have a significant effect on market price also depends upon the
other determinants of market power discussed in this section,
such as the supply response of other firms.
" This "endowment" of a large market share did no, how-
ever, mean that AT&T was "endowed" with significant market
power. Indeed, Judge Greene, who oversaw the divestiture of
AT&T, concluded that:
[o]nce AT&T is divested of the local Operating Compa-
ture."5 That endowment, however, did not ensure
that AT&T would have monopoly control over the
supply of long-distance services. Thus, the informa-
tion that, in some cases, might be contained in a
market share number at a specific point in time is
diluted substantially by the fact that AT&T began
the post-divestiture period with an inherited high
share. The competitive significance of a market share
number, however, stems from a firm's ability (or
lack thereof) to retain a given market share in the
wake of an attempt to raise prices to above-competi-
tive levels.3 6 Firms whose market share declines over
time in a market with stable (or falling) prices are
very unlikely to have significant market power.
In this context, the presence of a high market
share at a given point in time provides virtually no
information on the incumbent firm's vulnerability to
market share losses. Accordingly, any analysis of
market share should examine the dynamic path of a
firm's market share over time. Where the analysis
reveals substantial market share losses, the observed
vulnerability indicates significant limits on the firm's
market power, regardless of the current level of its
(statically-measured) market share. This is particu-
larly true if significant price increases have not oc-
curred. If the firm's market share has been vulnera-
ble in the absence of substantial price increases, then
it is extremely unlikely that the firm will be able to
sustain its share in the presence of a significant price
increase. The ability to maintain market share in the
presence of a significant price increase is a true mea-
sure of market power.
Further, although minutes-of-use and revenue-
based market share statistics are more readily availa-
ble, in the case of the long-distance services market it
is more meaningful to review market share measures
based on the relative amount of transmission capaci-
ties held by interexchange firms. Capacity-based
market share figures, combined with information on
nies, it will be unable either to subsidize the prices of its
interexchange service with revenues from local exchange
services or to shift costs from competitive interexchange
services ... [w]ith the removal of these barriers to compe-
tition, AT&T should be unable to engage in monopoly
pricing in any market.
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 552 F. Supp. 131,
172 (D.D.C. 1982), aftd sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
" "The right question is that of what happens to share, or,
more generally, to a firm's business when monopoly profits are
sought. The fundamental issue is whether competitors are able
to grow." FRANKLIN FISHER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Ec-
ONOMICS, AND THE LAW 15 (1991).
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customers' willingness to switch suppliers, 8 reveal
whether existing firms can rapidly expand output or
service availability in response to an attempted price
increase. Consequently, capacity-based market
shares are a more accurate indicator of the market's
ability to enforce competitive pricing behavior."8
It is important to understand that a firm cannot
hold significant market power unless it has a large
market share and other firms' supply responsiveness
is low. That is, either a low market share or a high
responsiveness of other firms' supply to price
changes means that the firm is facing effective com-
petition. If market share is low, significant market
power cannot exist even if the responsiveness of
other firms' supply to price changes is limited. Con-
versely, where other firms' supply is highly respon-
sive to price changes, an individual firm cannot pos-
sess significant market power even if it holds a very
high share.
The consequent need to examine both entry/ex-
pansion conditions and market share characteristics
has been emphasized repeatedly by antitrust enforce-
ment agencies.8 9 State regulatory commissions also
have recognized the importance of entry conditions
and the corresponding need to look beyond market
share figures in evaluating the intensity of competi-
tion. For example, the Virginia State Corporation
Commission substantially reduced its regulation of
interexchange carriers in 1984, reasoning that "the
threat of competition is, in itself, a potent check on a
firm's pricing policies."' 0 Additional state-level rec-
ognition of the role of entry conditions in market
power assessments is provided by the ongoing moni-
toring process by the California Public Utilities
Commission of the intrastate interexchange market-
place. Their most recent assessment concludes that
"[there are no significant barriers to entry that
would discourage companies from competing in the
California Interexchange market, and there are no
barriers to exit.""' Thus, many state commissions
have correctly incorporated the role of entry condi-
tions in their evaluations of market power.
Totally specious conclusions may be reached if en-
try and expansion conditions are ignored and focus is
placed solely on market share. It is necessary to look
beyond market share." While market share is one of
the economic determinants of market power, it can-
not by itself demonstrate that a firm has significant
control over market price. The other economic deter-
minants, such as entry conditions, must also be con-
ducive to providing such control.
" Consumers' high willingness to switch carriers is ad-
dressed infra at notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
" "Analytically, capacity seems to be the correct choice. The
power of the dominant firm is limited not by the amount its
competitors are currently manufacturing but by the amount they
could manufacture in response to the dominant firm's price in-
crease." Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Analysis of Market
Power, with Some Thoughts About Regulated Industries, in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION: MARKET POWER AND
COST ALLOCATION ISSUES 7 (John R. Allison & Dennis L.
Thomas eds. 1990).
" For example, the Federal Trade Commission has stated:
Ideally, if we could measure all relevant demand and sup-
ply elasticities, we could arrive at relatively precise esti-
mates of market power. Such evidence, however, is rarely,
if ever, available and is not readily susceptible to direct
measurement. Therefore, other criteria must be utilized.
The most probative criteria include entry barriers; concen-
tration trends (including volatility of market shares); tech-
nological change; demand trends; and market definition..
• [tihe issue of entry barriers is perhaps the most impor-
tant qualitative factor, for if entry barriers are very low it
is unlikely that market power, whether individually or
collectively exercised, will persist for long.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENT CONCERNING
HORIZONTAL MERGERS, TRADE REG. REPORTS 20,901, at
20,902 (1993).
40 Re SouthernTel of Va., Inc., Final Order and Opinion,
62 PUR4th 245, 256 (1984). In a similar vein, the West Vir-
ginia Public Service Commission wrote in 1986 that:
We realize that AT&T does enjoy a large share of the
interLATA toll market; however, market share in and of
itself is not the only criterion to be considered for regula-
tory purposes. Indeed we consider ease of entry, availabil-
ity of customer choices and the presence of alternate carri-
ers to be more important factors.
In re MCI Telecomm. Corp., Generic Order, 75 PUR4th 487,
498 (1986).
41 CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, THE COMM'N. ADVISORY AND
COMPLIANCE Div., REPORT ON 1992 CALIFORNIA INTER-
EXCHANGE MARKET (1995).
"" Almost a half a century ago, Nobel Laureate Paul Samu-
elson noted that:
[t]he demand curve of any firm is equal to the demand
curve of the industry minus the supply curve of the re-
maining firms, already in the industry or potentially
therein. This being the case, it is easy to show that under
uniform constant costs the demand curve for a firm is hor-
izontal even though it produces 99.9 per cent of all that is
sold ... [e]conomically if the firm were to begin to restrict
output so as to gain monopoly profit, it would cease to see
99.9 per cent of the output or even anything at all. Conse-
quently, it would not attempt to do so, but would find its
maximum advantage in behaving like a pure competitor.




III. APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
CRITERIA TO THE INTEREXCHANGE SER-
VICES MARKET
The variety of data now available from several
different sources permits an informed assessment of
the extent of competition in the interexchange mar-
ket. A review of the data, in light of the criteria
identified in Section II, above, leads to the conclusion
that the interexchange market is effectively competi-
tive."' Neither AT&T nor any other competitor in
the interexchange market has sufficient market
power to control price in a manner adverse to the
public interest. Let us examine each of the criteria
identified above.
First, the available evidence unequivocally reveals
that AT&T's competitors have a high responsiveness
or elasticity of supply and that barriers to entry and
expansion in this market are very low. This conclu-
sion should not be surprising. The FCC and state
regulatory bodies have liberally granted entry to
long-distance firms, effectively eliminating all regu-
latory barriers to entry. This liberalization of prior
entry restrictions is vividly demonstrated by the
number of firms that have entered this market. As
shown in Figure 1, over 450 competitors were pro-
viding long-distance service in the United States."
This flood of new entry, especially in the face of sig-
nificant price decreases, clearly demonstrates that ec-
onomic barriers to entry into this market are ex-
tremely low. Also, as seen in Figure 2, the total
minutes-of-use reported by the non-AT&T long-dis-
tance competitors for interstate services has grown at
an annual average rate of roughly twenty percent for
the 1984-1994 period.' Thus, as new firms have en-
tered this market, they have been able to expand
their output (sales) rapidly. Another important fac-
tor in determining new firms' ability to expand out-
4' For similar conclusions see generally MICHAEL PORTER,
COMPETITION IN THE LONG DISTANCE MARKET (1993);
MICHAEL WARD, MEASUREMENTS OF MARKET POWER IN
LONG DISTANCE TELECOMMUNICATIONS, FTC, BUREAU OF
ECONOMICS STAFF REPORT (1995); Michael L. Katz & Robert
D. Willig, The Case for Freeing AT&T, 7 REG. 43-49 (1983);
Robert E. Hall, Long Distance: Public Benefits from Increased
Competition, APPLIED ECON. PARTNERS (1993); see also David
L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Deregulation and Market
Power Criteria: An Evaluation of State Level Telecommunica-
tions Policy, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION: MAR-
KET POWER AND COST ALLOCATION ISSUES 65-102 (1990);
David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Long Distance Tele-
communications Policy: Rationality on Hold, 122 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 18 (1988); Kahai et al., supra note 27.
44 TELEPHONE TRENDS, supra note 5.
'a MARKET SHARES, supra note 7, Tbl. 2.
put (the elasticity of their supply) is the distribution
of transmission capacity in the interexchange market.
If existing firms' output were capacity-constrained,
their ability to defeat an attempted AT&T price in-
crease could be limited. If competitors have abundant
capacity, however, both their ability and willingness
to lure away customers and expand output is height-
ened, especially if consumers demonstrate a willing-
ness to utilize their services.
Data collected by the FCC and other studies indi-
cate that the capacity available for the transmission
of long-distance traffic is abundant.' First, capacity
expansion in this market has been rapid and signifi-
cant. As shown in Figure 3, AT&T's competitors
have aggressively built fiber-optic transmission ca-
pacity, and collectively they now own more activated
capacity than AT&T."7 It is also generally acknowl-
edged that the large gap between activated fiber ca-
pacity and the potential capacity of the networks
now in place creates a huge reserve of additional ca-
pacity that could rapidly and inexpensively be
brought on-line should any firm in the market at-
tempt to price anticompetitively. Moreover, the dis-
tribution of capacity across scores of interexchange
carriers and "carriers' carriers" assures that no sin-
gle firm can limit competition through exercise of
"bottleneck" control of transmission capacity. Thus,
competing carriers' ability to rapidly expand output
in this market at low marginal cost is unconstrained
due to the widespread availability of abundant trans-
mission capacity.
By definition, where new firms have demonstrated
their ability to enter a market and successfully cap-
ture market share over a protracted period of time,
economic barriers to entry and expansion are low
and, the responsiveness of their output to price is
high.' Many new firms have entered the inter-
exchange market, built large amounts of capacity,
46 See, e.g., FIBER DEPLOYMENT UPDATE, supra note 6.
47 Id. Tbl. 2.
48 Recently, it has been alleged that the emergence of fiber-
optic technology has created "huge" barriers to entry into the
long distance market. See, e.g., Jerry Hausman, The Long Dis-
tance Markets Today (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors). Such a conclusion is erroneous for at least two
reasons. First, the argument uses the wrong standard to judge
the height of barriers to entry. Entry barriers should be mea-
sured by examining the economic characteristics of the costs for
the most likely mode of entry. Thus, the fact that the construc-
tion and deployment of a nationwide fiber optic long-distance
network is costly and involves considerable sunk costs is irrele-
vant, because that is not the preferred least-cost mode of entry.
Profit maximizing firms will typically seek to enter markets via
a least-cost strategy that minimizes their exposure to losses if the
new venture fails. In the case of the long-distance industry, this
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provided a wide array of long-distance telecommuni-
cations services, and expanded their output rapidly.
This entry and expansion has benefited consumers
by enhancing customer choice, creating downward
pressure on prices, and providing heightened incen-
tives for new service innovations. In addition, the
high supply elasticity demonstrated by this observed
behavior assures the long-run viability of competition
in this market.
Turning to the second set of market power deter-
minants, virtually all of the fundamental demand
factors identified in Section II also unequivocally
point toward the presence of effective competition.
For example, demand growth has been quite strong
in the long-distance market. Interexchange switched
access minutes have grown nationally at an average
rate of about ten percent annually since 1984.' This
healthy growth rate has facilitated the emergence of
new competitors, as entrepreneurs seek to garner a
share of this burgeoning market."0 Indeed, this mar-
ket growth has undoubtedly contributed to the ob-
served entry of hundreds of new firms into the inter-
exchange market. Moreover, the outlook for
continued growth in telecommunications markets ap-
pears excellent.
The distribution of demand also points toward the
likelihood of vigorous competitive rivalry among the
market participants. The demand for long-distance
calling is highly skewed. For AT&T, fifty-three per-
cent of its residential customers account for ninety-
three percent of long-distance revenues. 1  This
skewed demand distribution contributes to the vul-
nerability of interexchange companies' market
shares. Any attempt by one interexchange company
to raise prices above competitive levels would provide
significant financial incentives for its largest and
most profitable customers to switch carriers.
Consumers' willingness and ability to switch firms
least-cost path does not involve de novo construction of a fiber
optic transmission network but, rather, entry by leasing existing
capacity. As new entrants grow and expand their customer ba-
ses, a point is reached where it may become economical to con-
struct their own transmission networks, depending on the price
and availability of leased facilities. Second, regardless of any the-
oretical arguments regarding barriers to entry, the overwhelming
marketplace evidence regarding actual entry and expansion belie
the notion that any significant barriers to entry and expansion in
the interexchange industry exist. For a more complete discussion
see David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Long Distance Tele-
communications: Expectations and Realizations in the Post-Di-
vestiture Period, in INCENTIVE REGULATION FOR PUBLIC UTIL-
ITIES 83 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1994).
'9 MARKET SHARES, supra note 7, Tbl. 1.
"0 See, e.g., Catherine Arnst et al., Phone Frenzy: Is There
Anyone Who Doesn't Want To Be a Telecom Player?, Bus.
also clearly shows that no interexchange firm can
manipulate the market price. Consumers' ability to
switch, of course, depends upon the ease with which
competing firms can reach customers seeking to util-
ize their services. The equal access conversion pro-
cess, which is now virtually complete, has facilitated
this capability to provide customers a ready choice of
carriers. By the end of 1993, over ninety-seven per-
cent of the nation's telephone lines had been con-
verted to equal access."2 This conversion ensures that
consumers have a readily available choice of a vari-
ety of long-distance carriers. Indeed, a recent survey
of available choices for "1 +" long-distance carriers
found that residential customers typically have be-
tween ten and thirty long-distance carriers from
which to choose."3 Importantly, this competitive
choice is available to customers in urban, suburban,
and rural areas. As a result, substantial competitive
choice is now ubiquitous throughout the United
States. In today's environment, there is simply no
substantial portion of the population without a sig-
nificant choice of long-distance carriers.
Not only do consumers typically have a number of
long-distance carriers from which to choose, but they
also have demonstrated in droves that they are will-
ing to exercise that choice. Indeed, according to in-
dustry data, in 1994 residential customers switched
their long-distance carrier twenty-seven million
times.5 ' Taking "multiple switchers" into account,
this represents carrier changes by over nineteen mil-
lion customers in 1994, or about one in five house-
holds. Based upon the most recent data available, it
appears that households will switch their long-dis-
tance company roughly thirty million times in
1995." 5 Moreover, it is important to note that it is
not just high volume customers who switch to alter-
native long distance carriers. Specifically, in 1994,
over ten million AT&T customers with average
WK., Feb. 20, 1995, at 92-97.
51 See Ex Parte Presentation in Support of AT&T's Motion
for Reclassification as a Nondominant Carrier, in CC Dkt. No.
79-252 (Mar. 9, 1995) [hereinafter Mar. 9 Ex Parte Presenta-
tion] (chart labeled, "over half of Light Users currently fall be-
low break even").
82 TELEPHONE TRENDS, supra note 5, Tbl. 12.
5 See Kaserman & Mayo, supra note 48, at 92-93.
Ex Parte Presentation in Support of AT&T's Motion for
Reclassification as a Non-Dominant Carrier, in CC Dkt. No.
79-252 (Feb. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Feb. 8 Ex Parte Presentation]
(chart labeled "Competition - Customers' Freedom of Choice").
See also Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 2, 1995)
(prepared statement of John W. Mayo at 3).
"' Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 1, Att. I (chart labeled
"The Long Distance Market").
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monthly usage of less than ten dollars per month
switched carriers.86 Consequently, all consumers
possess both the willingness and ability to switch be-
tween long-distance firms.
-Turning last to the market share data, capacity-
based estimates reveal that AT&T's current market
share is roughly between forty and forty-five per-
cent.5" AT&T's competitors-thus have more fiber op-
tic capacity in place (measured by fiber-miles or
route-miles) than AT&T. As a consequence of pre-
vailing capacity and demand conditions, it has been
estimated that AT&T's competitors could immedi-
ately absorb fifteen percent of AT&T's 1993 demand
without incurring any capital costs." Moreover, by
utilizing spare switch ports and existing transport fa-
cilities, it is estimated that AT&T's competitors
could absorb an additional seventeen percent of
AT&T's 1993 traffic within three months." Given
the rapidly evolving nature of the electronics of
switching and the commensurate increases in switch-
ing capacity, it is clear that the capacity of any given
carrier can be expanded very rapidly by deploying
newly available electronics. For example, relatively
straightforward alterations in the electronics may
boost several-fold the average number of DS-3's per
fiber pair embodied in today's electronics.6° Thus,
for purposes of market power assessment, AT&T's
capacity-based market share measurement is actually
quite conservative. 1 AT&T's output-based 1994
market share is somewhat higher, about fifty-eight
percent of all interstate minutes-of-use." While
these alternative measures indicate that AT&T is a
major competitor in the interexchange services mar-
ket, they are not out of line with the market shares
of other firms (e.g., Campbell Soup Company)
which operate in unregulated environments."
Moreover, AT&T's market share is not static.
The temporal pattern of its market share reveals that
AT&T's services are quite vulnerable to competitive
56 Id. at 34.
57 FIBER DEPLOYMENT UPDATE, supra note 6.
" See Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 1, at 2.
I9 d.
e0 Id. at 6.
11 These estimates, proffered by AT&T, are claimed to be
conservative since they are based solely on MCI, Sprint, and
LDDS/Wiltel and ignore AT&T's other competitors in this
area. Id. at 2.
e' MARKET SHARES, supra note 7.
e3 JOHN SUTTON, SUNK COST AND MARKET STRUCTURE:
PRICE COMPETITION, ADVERTISING, AND THE EVOLUTION OF
CONCENTRATION Tbl. M.8 (1991) (listing market shares in the
prepared soups industry).
" The vulnerability of AT&T to market share losses appar-
attacks by rivals even in the absence of an attempted
price increase. At the time of divestiture, AT&T sold
the predominant share of interexchange services in
the United States. Figure 4 reveals that AT&T's
minutes-of-use market share has declined almost
continually throughout the post-divestiture period."
The fact that this decline has occurred over an eleven
year period in which AT&T's prices have fallen
dramatically (over fifty percent in real terms) 6
clearly indicates that AT&T will be highly vulnera-
ble to even larger market share losses if it should
ever fail to offer quality services at competitive
prices.
Significantly, the aggregate trend of market share
declines masks an even more revealing vulnerability
of AT&T's customer base. As noted above, the long-
distance marketplace is characterized by a considera-
ble amount of customer churn. In 1994, some
twenty-seven million households switched long-dis-
tance carriers."' This widespread propensity of many
customers to switch carriers reveals the vulnerability
of every long-distance firm to rapid market share
erosion. AT&T's overall market share trend reveals
only the net effect of household switching. The true
vulnerability of AT&T to market share erosion is
considerably greater than the net market share trend
shown in Figure 4 suggests. On a monthly basis, res-
idential customers are changing carriers over two
and a half million times. Given such demonstrated
willingness to change carriers, a single mis-step by
AT&T could result in significant and dramatic share
loss. This vulnerability to competitors is similar for
the business segment, where churn levels are some-
what lower but revenue per customer is much
higher. Such vulnerability clearly shows that the
marketplace effectively disciplines AT&T's pricing
behavior.67 The principal conclusion to be drawn
from the declining market share and substantial cus-
tomer churn data is that, regardless of the historical
ently extends well beyond the losses to MCI and Sprint. Indeed,
recent data indicates that the most rapid growth in presubscribed
lines in recent periods has come from the so called "third tier"
carriers. KASERMAN & MAYO, supra note 20.
e WARD, supra note 43, at 11.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
'7 AT&T's market share losses are not due to the ability of
regulators to effectively restrain some innate advantage that
AT&T might have were it freed from regulatory controls. Mar-
ket share declines have occurred not only in states where AT&T
has been asymmetrically regulated (e.g., New York), but also in
states such as Virginia in which the regulatory commission has
eliminated asymmetric regulation. See supra notes 40-41 and ac-
companying text.
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"dominance" of AT&T in the market, no firm today
is immune to large market share swings if it were to
attempt to charge non-competitive prices. 68
In sum, the presence of numerous competitors, the
demonstrated vulnerability of AT&T's market share,
the widespread availability of transmission capacity,
the minimal amount of economic barriers to entry,
and the fundamentally pro-competitive demand con-
ditions in the interexchange market clearly demon-
strate the presence of effective competition. More-
over, several factors indicate that this competition
exists not just at, the aggregate level, but also for
every toll service and each geographic area within
the country. As pointed out in Section II, the degree
of competition is only meaningful when discussed
with respect to "the relevant market." In this case,
the relevant market includes all interexchange toll
services sold in the United States." Thus, the finding
of effective competition in the relevant market neces-
sitates the conclusion that such competition exists for
each service and geographic area within that market.
Therefore, AT&T faces competitors in every geo-
graphic area within the United States and for every
toll service it offers.
70
IV. COMPETITION IN THE INTER-
EXCHANGE MARKET: OTHER EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE
The foregoing analysis provides clear evidence
that the interexchange market is subject to effective
competition. Corroborating evidence of such competi-
*" In this context, it is important to note that any explicit
public policy linkage between AT&T's market share and the re-
moval of the "dominant" label and asymmetric regulation would
constitute very poor policy. Indeed, a policy that predicates an
end to asymmetric regulation on AT&T's market share falling
below some specific threshold reduces all firms' propensities to
compete. AT&T would, under such a policy, be encouraged to
refrain from aggressive competition in order to allow its market
share to fall below the threshold level. It could do this, for in-
stance, by raising prices, refusing to offer new services, or al-
lowing quality to fall. At the same time, the firms attempting to
prolong regulation of AT&T would face an incentive not to cap-
ture too much market share, so as to deny the "dominant" firm
regulatory freedoms to fully and freely compete for customers'
patronage. Thus, under a "market share threshold" policy, if
competitors succeed in attracting customers away from AT&T,
the "reward" is the deregulation of AT&T. In this scenario, the
entire competitive process is put in reverse. A contest is created
to see who can turn in the worst performance. This is the funda-
mental reason that the federal antitrust authorities have not es-
tablished a singular focus on market share or created any market
share threshold test for the existence of significant monopoly
power.
tion stems from two additional sources that we
briefly review in this section. First, although it was
possible in the immediate wake of the divestiture to
argue (largely on conceptual grounds) that AT&T
had very little market power, we now have had over
ten years of actual marketplace experience on which
to base this conclusion. Numerous states have exper-
imented with relaxed and, in many cases, symmetric
regulation of interexchange carriers. Second, the
FCC has substantially relaxed its regulation of inter-
state business services. Such experimentation pro-
vides a natural opportunity to observe AT&T's mar-
ket behavior in a less stringent regulatory
environment and offers empirical evidence of
AT&T's lack of market power. In addition, the pas-
sage of time and the advancement of empirical in-
dustrial organization methodologies since the divesti-
ture have now created the opportunity to formally
(econometrically) test the hypothesis that AT&T re-
tains significant monopoly power. Specifically, it has
become possible, to estimate directly the degree of
market power held by AT&T. In the three subsec-
tions that follow, we briefly describe the results of
these two types of studies.
A. Relaxed Regulation: The State Evidence
Beginning with the Virginia State Corporation
Commission's decision in late 1984 to grant full pric-
ing flexibility to all long-distance firms, including
AT&T, 1 the vast majority of states now have re-
laxed regulation of intrastate interLATA toll service
* See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
70 As noted above, over 97% of all local exchange access lines
in the United States have now been converted to equal access,
ensuring dialing and technical interconnection parity between
AT&T and its competitors in virtually every geographic location
in the United States. TELEPHONE TRENDS, supra note 5, Tbl.
12. Even the tiny fraction of customers without equal access are
protected from market power by the practice of geographically
uniform pricing. This practice assures that the price of a long-
distance call is the same regardless of whether the origination
and termination locations are urban or rural, equal access or
nonequal access. Because competition is pervasive in equal access
areas with (typically) between 15 and 30 long distance carriers,
nonequal access areas are also assured competitive pricing.
Kaserman & Mayo, supra note 48, at 92-93. Moreover, even in
areas where equal access is not yet implemented, it is routine for
long-distance customers to be served by several interexchange
carriers. See, e.g., In re PSC's Investigation of the Regulatory
Status of Other Common Carriers and Contemplated Rulemak-
ing, MONTANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMM'N, Dkt. No. 94.2.8.
(Direct Testimony of John W. Mayo)(June 10, 1994).
7" See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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to varying degrees.1 As a result, it has become in-
creasingly possible to examine empirically the cumu-
lative evidence regarding the effects of such policies
and to make informed judgments about the likely
impacts of a further relaxation of regulatory con-
trols. This type of evidence is extremely important in
public policy proceedings, because parties opposed to
relaxed regulation of AT&T have often argued that
such a policy would lead to various sorts of undesir-
able consequencess.7  For instance, some parties have
predicted that AT&T would use its newfound pric-
ing freedom to charge monopoly prices, including
differentiating between terms offered in contract tar-
iffs for end users and those for resellers of telecom-
munications services to disadvantage its competi-
tors.7 4 Others fear that relaxed regulation would
lead to predatory pricing, cross-subsidization, or re-
ductions in universal service.7 6 Given these predic-
tions, it is informative to look at the experience with
reduced regulation of AT&T. If these feared conse-
quences have not emerged under reduced regulation,
the predictions lose their credibility.
The available evidence strongly indicates that con-
sumers have benefited substantially from reduced
regulation. Indeed, industry performance has im-
proved markedly with the relaxation of regulatory
controls. It is of specific interest to regulatory com-
missions' current and ongoing deliberations that no
evidence exists that in those state jurisdictions where
policies of continued asymmetric regulation remain
that competitive performance in the interexchange
market has in any way improved. In fact, the availa-
"' See supra note 15.
78 David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, The Ghosts of
Deregulated Telecommunications: An Essay by Exorcists, 6 J.
POL'Y. ANALYSIS MGMT. 84, 85 (1986); Kaserman & Mayo,
Long Distance Telecommunications Policy: Rationality on Hold,
supra note 43, at 21-25.
" Comments of the Telecommunications Resellers Ass'n. to
the Ex Parte Presentation in Support of AT&T's Motion for
Reclassification as a Non-Dominant Carrier, at App. 1 (June 9,
1993).
75 MCI Telecommunications Corporation has argued that it
is premature to classify AT&T as non-dominant because it still
has substantial market share, dominates in market segments
seemingly "immune to the introduction of effective competition,"
and holds key patents for fundamental telecommunications sys-
tems. Comments of MCI Tel. Corp. to the Ex Parte Presenta-
tion in Support of AT&T's Motion for Reclassification as a
Non-Dominant Carrier passim (June 9, 1995). MCI suggested
that the FCC should at least reaffirm important "market rules"
to ensure that AT&T does not avoid its legal obligations. Id. at
7-21. Four of the Regional Bell Operating Companies have ar-
gued that the major long distance telephone companies have es-
tablished a cooperative pricing pattern in which they generally
increase prices on one another's lead. Further Opposition of Bell
ble evidence strongly suggests that such regulation
has actually caused consumers to pay higher prices.
This conclusion is supported by several 'studies.
For example, one study of the effects of regulation
and competition on the prices of AT&T's intrastate
toll rates found that "[tlhe price of AT&T was
found to be lower in states with pricing flexibility
than in states where AT&T was operating under
rate of return regulation . . . [h]owever, the price of
AT&T service was lowest in states with complete
deregulation." 6 This study is congruent with an
earlier study by staff economists at the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") in which the authors
concluded, "(t)he results of this analysis suggest that
AT&T's daytime, evening, nighttime and weekend
rates are significantly lower in states that allow pric-
ing flexibility than in states that use rate-of-return
regulation." 7 7 Indeed, the study indicates that the
price of a five-minute daytime intrastate toll call
was, on average, 7.2 percent lower in states that al-
low AT&T increased pricing flexibility.7
Together, these studies reject the hypothesis that
anticompetitive pricing has occurred under relaxed
regulatory policies and allay any fears of price esca-
lation after regulation is relaxed. Indeed, the results
demonstrate that relaxed regulation is pro-competi-
tive, and generally leads to significant price reduc-
tions. The results also provide compelling evidence
that AT&T lacks significant market power. If
AT&T had such power, relaxed regulation should
have led to higher (not lower) prices.
79
Assessing whether any states have deemed it nec-
Atlantic, BellSouth, Pacific Telesis, and SBC Communications
to the Motion for Reclassification of AT&T as a Nondominant
Carrier (June 9, 1995) [hereinafter RBOC Comments]. See also
William E. Taylor & J. Douglas Zona, Analysis of the State of
Competition in Long Distance Telephone Markets (1995), in
RBOC Comments, Att. E.
"' Robert Kaestner & Brenda Kahn, The Effects of Regula-
tion and Competition on the Price of AT&T Intrastate Tele-
phone Service, 2 J. REG. ECON. 363, 372 (1990).
" Alan D. Mathios & Robert P. Rogers, The Impact of Al-
ternative Forms of State Regulation of AT&T on Direct-Dial,
Long Distance Telephone Rates, 20 RAND. J. ECON. 437, 437
(1989).
78 Id. at 447.
79 One study reaches the conclusion that regulatory manipu-
lation of access charges assessed to long-distance carriers, not
competition, has been responsible for price declines in the inter-
exchange marketplace. See William Taylor & Lester D. Taylor,
Postdivestiture Long-Distance Competition in the United States,
83 AM. ECON. REV. 185, 189 (1993). This conclusion, as well as
the underlying data and methodology embodied in the study, are,
however, subject to serious debate. See, e.g., Letter from E. E.
Estey, Regulatory V.P., AT&T, to William F. Caton, Acting
Secretary, FCC (Mar. 21, 1995), in Ex Parte Preseniatin,
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essary to reverse reduced regulation policies in re-
sponse to any performance problems presents an-
other perspective on the experience with relaxed
regulation. Virtually all of the states that have im-
plemented reduced regulation have retained their au-
thority to reinstitute more stringent regulatory con-
trols if the experience did not benefit consumers.
Moreover, these states have continued to monitor va-
rious aspects of market performance to detect
whether any undesirable consequences have materi-
alized. An absence of reregulation clearly is indica-
tive of competitive market performance.
Here again, the evidence is unequivocal. No state
that has relaxed regulation has found it necessary to
reverse itself. Indeed, in the state with the longest
experience with relaxed (and symmetric) regulation,
the Virginia State Corporation Commission staff
concluded that, "the information put forward here
reflects well, overall, on the effects of deregulation on
AT&T's prices in Virginia."'80 Similarly, in the state
of Washington, where AT&T has been granted sub-
stantial pricing flexibility with symmetric regulation,
an examination of interexchange rates led the Wash-
ington Utilities and Transportation Commission to
conclude that "the competitive marketplace is
working.""8
B. Relaxed Regulation: Business Services
The marketplace experience after the FCC's re-
laxation of regulation of AT&T's business services
in 1991 supplies additional evidence on the merits of
relaxed regulation.82 Competition for these services
has flourished in the wake of the removal of pricing
controls for AT&T. Moreover, while this competi-
supra note 1, Att. V (demonstrating that, when properly calcu-
lated, AT&T's rate reductions exceed access charge reductions
that have been resulting from regulation). Thus, while access
charge changes have, without doubt, contributed to the evolving
set of prices in the post-divestiture era, the assertion that revenue
reductions are eclipsed by access charge reductions is incorrect.
Moreover, the studies noted herein demonstrate that relaxed reg-
ulation of AT&T's toll services has had beneficial effects on
prices after accounting for access charge changes.
S0 VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, THE EFFECT OF DEREGULA-
TION ON AT&T PRICING IN VIRGINIA AND A COMPARISON OF
AT&T PRICING IN TEN STATES ACROSS THE UNITED STATES
14 (1987).
11 THE WASH. UTIL. AND TRANSP. COMM., THE STATUS
OF THE WASHINGTON TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 52
(submitted to the Washington State Legislature, Jan. 27, 1989).
" The FCC allowed AT&T to offer contract-based rates
and terms of service to business customers. AT&T was required
to file these rates and conditions with the Commission and to
make them generally available to all similarly situated custom-
tion has been "messy" for individual competitors,
with hundreds of promotional offerings and
thousands of individual contract offerings, customers
have benefited immensely. Nominal prices have de-
clined by roughly fifteen percent, scores of new ser-
vices have been introduced, and quality has im-
proved.88  This positive experience with . the
Commission's removal of pricing controls for busi-
ness services provides additional evidence that asym-
metric regulation of interexchange services is simply
unnecessary and is, in fact, harmful in today's
marketplace.
In summary, the published literature, internal
staff studies, and state and federal regulatory deci-
sions to retain relaxed regulation policies all support
the conclusion that effective competition prevails in
the interexchange market. This body of empirical ev-
idence does not support continued asymmetric regu-
lation of AT&T by either federal or state regulators
under the "dominant" firm classification inherited
from the pre-divestiture period.
C. Direct Econometric Estimates of AT&T's Mar-
ket Power
In recent years, the advancement of "new empiri-
cal industrial organization" techniques has provided
the means in certain situations to examine the mar-
ket power of individual firms directly."" At least two
such studies of the interexchange industry have now
been performed. 5 Both employ a variant of the so-
called residual demand estimation approach to gen-
erate empirical estimates of the "Lerner index" for
AT&T." This index provides a direct measure of
the degree of market power held by the firm.87 Inter-
ers, and such filings required 14 day notice. In re Competition
in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report & Order, 6
FCC Rcd. 5880, 5901, recon. in part, 6 FCC Rcd. 7569 (1991),
further recon., 7 FCC Rcd. 2677 (1992). Two years later, in the
same docket, the Commission concluded that the 800 services
market was competitive enough to remove price cap regulation
on AT&T for these services. Second Report & Order, 8 FCC
Rcd. 3668 (1993).
83 Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 1, at 39-40.
a' For a survey of studies making use of these techniques see
Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with
Market Power, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORGANIZATION
1011, 1051-55 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989).
8 WARD, supra note 43; Kahai et al., supra note 27.
See A.P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the
Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 THE REV. OF ECON.
STUD. 157 (1933-1934). Lerner sets forth a formula to measure
monopoly power. Where "P" is price and "C" is marginal cost,
the "Lerner index" is given by (P - C) / P. Id. at 169.
87 WARD, supra note 43.
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estingly, these two studies make use of substantially
different methodologies and data sets, yet they reach
strikingly similar conclusions. Specifically, both stud-
ies find that AT&T holds little market power. In
fact, the Lerner index for AT&T is found to be well
below that of many firms operating in completely
unregulated industries.
The first study, by Michael Ward, staff economist
at the FTC, makes use of two data sets - a time
series for interstate calling that covers the period
from July 1986 to August 1991, and a pooled sam-
ple of monthly data that covers the 1988-1991 period
for five states.88 His study focuses on the small busi-
ness and residential portion of the overall inter-
exchange market.8" Simultaneous equations estima-
tion techniques are employed to estimate both
demand and supply relationships.9 Ward's results
lend further support to the conclusion that AT&T
holds no economically significant market power in
the interexchange services market."'
The second study to attempt a direct measurement
of AT&T's market power is by Simran Kahai and
the authors of this paper. 2 This study makes use of
quarterly observations on interstate calling volumes
and tariffed rates for residential MTS service over
the period of third quarter 1984 to fourth quarter
1993. The theoretical framework for this study is
provided by the dominant firm/competitive fringe
model.9 Using this model, the study estimated si-
multaneously the total market demand and competi-
tive fringe supply curves while controlling for exoge-
88 Id. at 24-25.
" Note that this is the Price Cap Basket 1 portion of the
market, in which the greatest concern has been expressed re-
garding the possibility of significant market power by AT&T.
Thus, Ward's results should hold a fortiori for the remainder of
the interexchange market.
90 WARD, supra note 43, at v.
9' From the results of this estimation, Ward writes that
[tlhis study measures empirically the competitiveness of
the long-distance telephone market. To do so, it estimates
firm-specific long-run demand elasticities for AT&T and
its rivals for long-distance service marketed to households
and small businesses during 1988-1991. A lower-bound
for AT&T's long-run demand elasticity is estimated to be
approximately -10.1. If AT&T's prices were completely
unregulated, this elasticity estimate implies that the up-
per-bound deadweight loss due to allowing AT&T to set
prices in excess of marginal cost would be about 0.36% of
total industry revenues in 1991, or $199 million in 1991.
While direct estimates of the costs imposed by the current
form of regulation are not available, this welfare loss esti-
mate is well below previous estimates of the benefits that
followed partial deregulation of the long-distance mar-
ket. . .The estimation results lead us to a number of con-
clusions. Chief among them is that the long-distance mar-
nous variables such as the price of carrier access and
the percent of lines converted to equal access.94 From
these estimates and known values for AT&T's mar-
ket share (based on either capacity or minutes-of-
use), calculation of the price elasticity of AT&T's
residual'demand curve is feasible. The Lerner index
for AT&T, then, is given directly by the reciprocal
of this elasticity.
The estimated values for this index fall between
0.13 and 0.29, depending upon which market share
figure is used. 95 These values are then compared to
Lerner index estimates for other (predominantly un-
regulated) industries reported in two prior studies,
by Robert E. Hall"' and Timothy F. Bresnahan.
9 7
Both of these comparisons support the conclusion
that, relative to other firms in the United States
economy, AT&T possesses very little market power.
From these estimates and comparisons, the study
concludes that:
Comparison of these values with prior Lerner index esti-
mates for firms in other industries suggests that, relative
to these other (unregulated) industries, the long distance
market is highly competitive . . . [t]o the extent that the
'dominant firm' label and the affiliated policy of asymmet-
ric regulation were originally proposed as a mechanism to
handle residual, but significant, monopoly power on the
part of AT&T, our findings clearly indicate that this is a
label and policy that are no longer warranted."a
Thus, both studies have estimated directly the degree
of market power held by AT&T and are in close
agreement. Both demonstrate the positive impact of
ket is relatively competitive. Because the long-distance
market appears more competitive now than during the pe-
riod covered by our analysis, the current deadweight loss
from AT&T's exercise of market power may be even less
than our estimates.
Id. at iii-v.
92 See Kahai et al., supra note 27.
9 For a discussion of this model, see KASERMAN & MAYO,
supra note 20, at 104-09. Despite the rather pejorative title of
this model, its use implies no a priori presumption of significant
market power on the part of the so-called "dominant firm." See
generally Landes & Posner, supra note 21. For a more complete
discussion of the term "dominant" in the economics and telecom-
munications regulation literatures see Kahai et al., supra note
27.
9" Kahai et al., supra note 27, at 11-15.
" Id. at 20. These estimates are probably biased upward
due to the use of a short-run estimate of total market demand
elasticity. They imply a price elasticity of demand for AT&T's
services of between -3.45 and -7.69. Id.
"' Robert E. Hall, The Relation Between Price and Margi-
nal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. oF POL. EcoN. 921 (1988).
9 Bresnahan, supra note 84, at 1051.
9 Kahai et al., supra note 27, at 28-29.
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reduced regulation on market performance, and for-
tify the more traditional structure-conduct-perform-
ance studies of underlying industry characteristics.
The cumulative weight of this evidence overwhelm-
ingly supports the conclusion that the interexchange
market is subject to effective competition.
V. OTHER COMPETITIVE/POLICY ISSUES
The preceding assessment of the evidence from a
variety of sources clearly demonstrates that AT&T
does not possess the power to control price unilater-
ally in the interexchange market. That is, AT&T
does not have significant market power. Conse-
quently, under both the economic and regulatory
definitions of dominance, AT&T is not a dominant
firm.
Nonetheless, the authors have encountered some
parties who have been willing to accept (or, at least,
not oppose) this basic conclusion, but have been re-
luctant to advocate adoption of a symmetric regula-
tory policy. This reluctance is due to other concerns
about market conduct and performance that might
arise under such a policy. Specifically, three princi-
pal issues have been raised: the three largest firms
could engage in tacit collusion and supra-competitive
pricing;99 AT&T could engage in predatory pricing,
causing substantial exit and a reconcentration of the
market; and AT&T may raise prices to its low vol-
ume or rural customers, where it is believed to hold
a much larger market share."' 0 In this section, we
briefly address each of these competitive issues.
Before turning to these issues, however, two points
are worth noting. First, the competitive concerns
listed above are not new. Each of these issues has
been raised and successfully resolved in various
state-level regulatory proceedings. Despite allega-
tions based on these concerns, numerous state com-
missions have chosen to implement relaxed/symmet-
ric regulatory policies.101 To date, no evidence
whatsoever has appeared that would indicate that
anticompetitive consequences have emerged.
Second, when confronted with allegations that
" See RBOC Comments, supra note 75. See also Paul W.
MacAvoy, Tacit Collusion Under Regulation in the Pricing of
Interstate Long-Distance Telephone Services, 4 J. OF ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 147 (1995).
100 This list of competitive issues is not exhaustive. It does,
however, cover the major concerns that have been raised. This
article's analytic analysis in responding to these concerns and the
conclusions reached herein should easily be transferable to re-
lated issues.
101 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
these (or other) performance problems are likely to
materialize in a less stringently regulated environ-
ment, questions must be asked: What, precisely, is
the alleged concern? Is the market in question con-
ducive to the sort of behavior postulated, and is there
evidence that such behavior has arisen? Does the ex-
isting policy of asymmetric regulation make sense as
a policy instrument to prevent the alleged conduct?
Finally, is there an alternative, less stringent policy
that is likely to be more successful in addressing the
problem? Of course, the third and fourth questions
are relevant only if the answer to the second is
"yes." This sort of structured approach will help to
ensure that public policy is responsive to the realities
(and not the myths) of the marketplace. We now ap-
ply this approach to the issues listed above.
A. The Tacit Collusion Issue
From the time of divestiture, various parties have
argued that long-distance telecommunications firms
might engage (or are engaging) in tacit collusion to
keep prices above competitive levels. The concept of
tacit collusion was first developed by Edward H.
Chamberlin in 1933.10° The basic idea is that under
certain conditions, rival firms in a highly concen-
trated industry may gravitate toward the joint-profit
maximizing (i.e., monopoly) price and output with-
out actually entering into an explicit overt agreement
to fix prices.10 Whether this sort of behavior is
likely to occur, however, is highly dependent upon
the specific characteristics of the market in question.
For tacit collusion to arise, industry conditions must
be favorable to the stable sort of "meeting of the
minds" that must occur to sustain this type of highly
coordinated market conduct.1 0'
The market structure exhibited by the long-dis-
tance telecommunications industry is not conducive
to such tacit collusion. At least seven structural at-
tributes of this industry effectively preclude such be-
havior. First, collusion of any sort (either tacit or
overt) cannot succeed in the absence of significant
barriers to entry and expansion. The reason for this
101 EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPO-
LISTIC COMPETITION: A REORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF
VALUE (8th ed. 1962).
103 Id. at 106.
104 Conspiracy within an industry may exist only where the
behavior indicates "a unity of purpose or a common design and
understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful ar-
rangement." Nurse Midwifery Assoc. v. Hibbet, 918 F.2d 605,
616 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991).
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is straightforward. To the extent that colluding firms
succeed in raising market prices above competitive
levels, new firms will enter the industry and/or ex-
isting non-colluding firms will expand output unless
entry and expansion barriers prevent such natural
market responses. Such entry and output expansion
increase supply and drive prices back down, thereby
defeating any collusive attempts to increase prices.
Therefore, tacit collusion cannot succeed (and, conse-
quently, will not arise) in markets characterized by
relatively easy entry. Indeed, the fundamental role
that entry barriers play in allowing collusion or
other anticompetitive forms of conduct to arise has
led F.M Scherer and David Ross to write that, "sig-
nificant entry barriers are the sine qua non of mo-
nopoly and oligopoly . . . . Additionally, Roger
Sherman points out that "[tjo perpetuate a coopera-
tive solution, the firms must be able to limit indus-
trial capacity to supply the good. Existing firms must
resist expansion and there must be barriers to the
entry of new firms."' 06
No substantial barriers to entry into the long-dis-
tance telecommunications industry exist. The ob-
served entry of over 450 new firms during the past
decade in the face of declining prices provides com-
pelling evidence that entry into this market is readily
achievable. Moreover, the market is free of major
barriers to expansion that would prevent smaller
firms already in the market from increasing their
supply if the larger firms were to attempt to increase
prices above competitive levels. Both MCI and
Sprint entered this market at smaller scales than
many current market participants now enjoy. The
substantial market share gains these two firms have
realized could be replicated by the smaller carriers if
the top three firms were to increase prices to supra-
competitive levels. Indeed, the combined market
share of these smaller firms has more than doubled
in recent years and now exceeds the market share of
108 F.M. SCHERER AND DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 18 (1990).
106 ROGER SHERMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 264
(1974).
107 TELEPHONE TRENDS, supra note 5, at 45 (Tbl. 30).
108 See Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, Collusive
Pricing with Capacity Constraints in the Presence of Demand
Uncertainty, 23 RAND. J. ECON. 203 (1992), where in referring
to SCHERER & Ross, supra note 105, it notes a "large body of
empirical evidence" supports the proposition that the incentive
for vigorous price competition is most likely when capacity utili-
zation is low. Id. at 203. The authors provide additional theoret-
ical support for this proposition, concluding that price undercut-
ting and market share instability can emerge if excess capacity is
sufficiently great. Id. at 216.
Sprint."'0 With no substantial barriers to expansion,
these firms provide an effective constraint against
tacit collusion by AT&T and its larger rivals.
Therefore, the absence of significant entry and ex-
pansion barriers provides an effective safeguard
against tacit collusion in this market.
The second structural characteristic of the inter-
exchange market that prevents the emergence of tacit
collusion is the substantial amount of spare capacity
that exists in this industry. The economic literature
on collusive behavior widely recognizes the tendency
for collusive arrangements to break down in the
presence of excess capacity.' 08 The logic of the argu-
ment is straightforward. Where excess capacity is
present, the marginal cost of increasing the individ-
ual firm's output can be quite low. As a result, the
difference between a collusive price and marginal
cost becomes great, and the incentive to increase out-
put (or "cheat" on the collusive agreement) is corre-
spondingly great. As participating firms succumb to
this incentive to cheat, the collusive agreement col-
lapses and the market price falls towards the com-
petitive level.' 0 This has led Stephen Martin to con-
clude that "[f]or this reason, economists have argued
that substantial excess capacity increases the likeli-
hood of price wars and a breakdown in oligopolistic
control of prices."'' 0 Excess capacity is thus an
anathema to successful collusion. Its presence in the
long-distance market makes tacit collusion extremely
unlikely."'
The third structural characteristic that frustrates
any effort to achieve and maintain tacit collusion in
this industry is the marked differences that exist in
the market shares of the three largest firms. These
unequal shares tend to confound the sort of mutually
cooperative behavior that must be achieved without
explicit communication if tacit collusion is to suc-
ceed." Unless MCI and Sprint are content to con-
tinue to hold the market shares they now possess
'" While the traditional argument about the role of excess
capacity in frustrating collusive agreements has been cast in
terms of breaking down an existing agreement, the logic of this
argument applies equally to the inability to form such an agree-
ment in the presence of excess capacity.
110 STEPHEN MARTIN, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS: Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 149-50 (1988).
"1 This point has explicitly been recognized by various reg-
ulatory bodies including the FCC. See, e.g., AT&T Price Cap
Order, supra note 27, para. 25.
111 For an example of research demonstrating the con-
founding effects of marketplace asymmetries on supra-competi-
tive pricing see Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips & Clifford
Novell, Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets: An Experi-
mental Evaluation, 74 REV. OF ECON. AND STAT. 662, 670
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(which, historically, they clearly have not been con-
tent to do), their efforts to expand their shares will
doom to failure any tacitly collusive agreement. The
inherent tension created by substantially different
market shares also serves to reduce the likelihood of
tacit collusion.
The fourth characteristic of the long-distance mar-
ket that is fundamentally incompatible with tacit col-
lusion is the relatively complex structure of prices
and the predominant mechanism through which ef-
fective price changes are now instituted. The sort of
coordination-without-communication required for
tacit collusion to succeed is generally thought to re-
quire a high degree of product homogeneity with a
very simple price structure, i.e., a single, widely
known, price that is the same for each unit of output
sold."' Without such pricing simplicity, it becomes
exceedingly difficult for the parties to the (unstated)
agreement to know what price they are supposed to
charge. It also becomes much more tempting to cheat
on the agreement by lowering price, because such
behavior is more difficult to detect with a complex
pricing structure.
In the interexchange telecommunications market,
however, pricing is anything but simple. The price
for a minute of long-distance service from a given
supplier is likely to vary with distance, duration,
time of day, day of the week, and which (if any) dis-
count program is selected. Moreover, some carriers
compete by eliminating the distance sensitivity of
long-distance calling, while other carriers compete by
altering the time increments over which a call will
be measured. Additionally, numerous and frequent
price changes are initiated in this market by the va-
rious carriers through a plethora of discount pro-
grams and affinity marketing plans. For example,
joint marketing efforts between long-distance carriers
(1992) ("Our results indicate that asymmetry is a powerful con-
trol on cooperative behavior in highly concentrated markets ...
118 DENNIS W. CARLTON ET AL., MODERN INDUS. ORGAN-
IZATION (2d ed. 1994) "Firms have more difficulty agreeing on
relative prices when each firm's product has different qualities
or properties." Id at..
114 MCI pioneered this type of program in 1988 and now
has arrangements with at least four major airlines, American
Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Continental Airlines, and South-
west Airlines, that also include cellular and paging service.
Pager Messages Turn Into Frequent Flyer Miles with MCI,
PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 14, 1995, Financial Section. AT&T has
similar marketing programs and offers three USAir discount cer-
tificates to some of its Universal Mastercard credit and phone
cardholders. Lisa Fickenscher, Marketing: AT&T and Ameri-
can Express Pile Extras on College Cards, AMERICAN BANKER,
Sept. 5, 1995, at 24. American Express has offered its cardhold-
and airlines offer frequent flier miles in exchange for
using the long-distance carriers' service."1 Other
similar joint marketing programs between major
U.S. companies and interexchange carriers are be-
coming increasingly popular.1 5 The presence of
these "in kind" discounts make the pricing - both
identification and agreement - necessary for suc-
cessful tacit collusion among the various inter-
exchange carriers highly unlikely.
In recent years the use of short-run promotions
also has grown as a competitive instrument in this
market. For instance, in each of the past two years,
AT&T has introduced over 400 promotional offer-
ings. 1 Finally, the use of individual contracts be-
tween customers and long-distance carriers has in-
creased in recent years. Since 1993, AT&T alone
has filed some 2,000 contract tariffs for individual
customers.117 As a result, it is extremely difficult for
a competitor to know the effective price being
charged and very easy for any given competitor to
"cheat" on any pricing that is perceived to be above
competitive levels. In this incontrovertibly complex
and dynamic pricing environment, it strains credibil-
ity to contend that competitors could formulate and
sustain a tacitly collusive agreement to charge supra-
competitive prices.
The fifth characteristic of the interexchange tele-
communications market that is unfavorable to tacit
collusion is the dynamic nature of the technology in
this industry. 8 Where new products and/or pro-
duction techniques are a common occurrence, collu-
sive arrangements tend to be particularly difficult to
sustain, because such changes provide expanded op-
portunities and incentives to increase profits by
cheating on the agreement.11 While a price cut, if
detected, may be retaliated against quickly by rival
producers, thereby rapidly eroding the potential
ers 30 minutes of free MCI long-distance calls every month for a
year. Id. These types of programs, driven exclusively by the
rivalrous competition between the various long-distance carriers,
undeniably benefit long-distance consumers even though the ben-
efits may not appear in an examination of tariffed rates.
.. One example is AT&T offering customers the opportu-
nity to accumulate points toward a trip to Walt Disney World.
Edmund L. Andrews, Finding Best Deal Among Long-Distance
Calling Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1995, at 48.
11 Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 1, at 39-40.
11 Id. at 40.
118 "Industries that are subject to rapid technological change
find it particularly difficult to reach agreements." Alexis Jac-
quemin et al., Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORGANIZATION 415, 420 (Richard




gains from cheating, a new product cannot be so eas-
ily replicated. Consequently, the incentive to cheat
through product innovations can exceed the incentive
to cheat by simply reducing prices on a standardized
product. The outcome, however, is the same. As all
firms face the same incentives, cheating spreads and
the collusive arrangement breaks down. Therefore,
industries characterized by rapid product innovation,
such as the long-distance market, are generally con-
sidered to be unlikely candidates for tacit
collusion. 20
A sixth aspect of the interexchange marketplace
that undermines the potential for supra-competitive
pricing from tacit collusion stems from its market de-
mand characteristics. The well-known skewness in
the demand for long distance services - wherein a
relatively small share of interexchange customers ac-
count for a considerably larger share of the long dis-
tance business generated - creates a tremendous in-
centive for individual carriers to price aggressively.
Given the demonstrated willingness of customers to
switch their long distance carrier, this skewness of
demand creates huge opportunities for large market
share gains through aggressive pricing in the event
that any other carrier or set of carriers is not simi-
larly pricing aggressively. At the same time, this
skewness, taken together with the willingness to
switch long distance carriers, makes virtually every
firm in the interexchange marketplace vulnerable to
large market share losses if its prices were to rise to
supra-competitive levels as a result of tacit collusion.
Additionally, the overwhelming propensity of long-
distance consumers to switch their long-distance pro-
120 There has been a proliferation, if not explosion, of new
service offerings to long-distance consumers in the post-divesti-
ture period. A partial accounting for California alone found that
a minimum of 130 new long-distance services had been made
available to interexchange consumers in that state between 1984
and 1994. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, Ex. JWM-16 (Rebuttal
Testimony of John W. Mayo) (transcript on file with author).
See also Peter Pitsch, A Brief History of Competition in the
Long Distance Communications Market, at Tbl. 2, in Ex Parte
Presentation in Support of AT&T's Motion for Reclassification
as a Nondominant Carrier (Sept. 22, 1994).
121 MARTIN, supra note 110, at 147.
122 A related structural characteristic, market concentration,
is sometimes thought to facilitate tacit collusion. While market
concentration may, ceteris paribus, facilitate tacit collusion, this
factor is benign in the case of the long-distance industry. As
noted in the body of this paper, numerous other structural char-
acteristics undermine the ability of this market to successfully
maintain supra-competitive tacitly collusive prices, regardless of
the extent of concentration. Nothing about market concentration,
per se, mitigates any of the other impediments to successful tacit
collusion. Moreover, any partial tacit collusive scheme that in-
volves only the "concentrated" firms in this market becomes a
vider also undermines the prospect for tacit collusion.
"It follows that collusion is more likely to be success-
ful if customers do not switch suppliers very
often." 2'
A seventh structural characteristic of the inter-
exchange marketplace that erodes the potential for
supra-competitive pricing from tacit collusion is the
large number of firms that provide long-distance
telephone service in the United States."" It is well
established in the theoretical and empirical literature
that as the number of competitors in a market grows
the ability of the market to sustain supra-competitive
pricing falls. In particular, as the number of compet-
itors expands, the ability of the various competitors
to have a "meeting of the minds" becomes geometri-
cally more difficult.' 8 The sheer volume of competi-
tors and their virtual ubiquity provide a huge struc-
tural impediment to the prospect for tacitly collusive
supra-competitive pricing.
In addition to these structural characteristics, the
behavioral evidence against tacit collusion is equally
compelling. At least four aspects of observed conduct
and performance are clearly inconsistent with the
claim that tacit collusion is occurring in this market.
First, the downward trend in industry prices over
the past eleven years is clearly inconsistent with suc-
cessful collusion. Real transaction prices net of access
charges have fallen consistently since divestiture.
Moreover, the prices from which this downward
trend started had been set by regulators at "just and
reasonable" levels. It is hard to envision how one can
reconcile this trend with tacit collusion.""
Second, AT&T's market share has exhibited
license for other non-participating firms to expand sales and
profits. In particular, where the elasticity of supply of these
other market participants is high (i.e., barriers to entry and ex-
pansion are low), as it unequivocally is in this industry, any
"meeting of the minds" among a subset of the over 450 partici-
pants will be defeated by standard market forces.
128 See, e.g., MICHAEL KATZ & HARVEY S. ROSEN,
MICROECONoMics 565 (1991) ("The more firms in a market,
the less likely is cooperation, ceteris paribus.").
'"" Paul W. MacAvoy has asserted that prices have recently
risen and argued that this, along with allegedly stable market
shares, indicates that tacit collusion exists in this industry. See
Aff. of Paul W. MacAvoy at 52-53, United States v. Western
Elec. Co., Inc. & AT&T (D.C. Cir. 1956) (Civ. No. 82-0192),
in RBOC Comments, supra note 75, Att. A; MacAvoy, supra
note 99. This proposition has been rebutted with the argument
that MacAvoy's perceived price increases are illusory (stemming
from examination of AT&T's basic schedule tariffed rates rather
than the transaction prices consumers actually pay), and that the
alleged market share stability has turned out to be extremely
short-lived. Id. at 9,18 (Affs. of R. Glenn Hubbard and William
H. Lehr).
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marked instability throughout the post-divestiture
period. AT&T's market share reveals the net effect
of substantial underlying customer churn among the
competitors in this market. Unstable market share is
generally considered to be prima facie evidence of an
absence of successful collusion. Even opponents of
relaxed symmetric regulation in the interexchange
market acknowledge this point (albeit in different fo-
rums). For example, Jerry Hausman has stated that
"[c]hanging market shares are a sign of strong com-
petition."1" 5 Richard Schmalensee has also acknowl-
edged this point, writing that "[w]hile stable market
shares and firm ranks are consistent in principle
with either collusion or competition, most would ar-
gue that unstable shares and ranks are inconsistent
with effective collusion." ' Observed market share
changes in the long-distance industry therefore are
also inconsistent with tacit collusion.
Third, the advertising and aggressive marketing
campaigns of the three largest firms are inconsistent
with tacit collusion. These campaigns reveal an in-
tense rivalry and focus on price information that
would not likely exist under tacit collusion. For ex-
ample, a large proportion of competitors' commer-
cials are directly aimed at taking customers from ri-
vals by informing them of their new discount
programs. These programs account for much of the
observed price reductions implemented in recent
years. This advertising represents a drain on joint
profits and, therefore is inconsistent with the mainte-
nance of a tacit cooperative agreement among these
firms. In sum, the overtly aggressive solicitation ef-
forts that are readily observable at the most casual
level belie the contention that the interexchange mar-
ket is characterized by tacit collusion.
Fourth, if the hypothesis that tacit collusion has
arisen in the interexchange market in recent years
was correct, a distinct change in the supply behavior
of the smaller firms in the industry should be ob-
served at the time such an agreement arose. As can
be seen in Figure 2, however, no such change is ap-
parent in the data on AT&T's competitors' output at
any point in time. As discussed above, applying a
more rigorous, explicit econometric test by modeling
113 See Aff. of Jerry Hausman at 14, W. Elec. Co., in
RBOC Comments, supra note 75, Att. C.
"e Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure
and Performance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORGANIZATION
951, 999 (Richard Schmalensee et al., eds., 1989).
137 Kahai et al., supra note 27, at 29.
Earlier studies discussed in this article also confirm that
reduced and symmetric regulation of AT&T has not resulted in
successful tacit collusion. See, e.g., Mathios & Rogers, supra
the market demand and competitive fringe supply
curves simultaneously while controlling for various
exogenous factors yields no evidence whatsoever to
support a finding of tacit collusion. 27 Industry struc-
ture, observed behavior, and formal econometric test-
ing thus all confirm the -conclusion that tacit collu-
sion will not arise and has not arisen in this
market."12
Moreover, contrary to assertions advanced by
MacAvoy, 9 recent rate restructuring in the long-
distance market - basic schedule increases more
than offset by price cuts in discount offerings - ap-
pears to reflect competitive pressures to move prices
to cost. "AT&T's basic schedule rates do not recover
the direct costs of serving the one third of customers"
that call less than $3 per month. 0 These costs in-
clude monthly subsidy costs for universal service "of
$.52 per customer and bill-rendering costs ranging
from $.33 to $.88 per customer." ' 1 Thus, in contrast
to the fanciful tale of tacit collusion, a far more
straightforward market-based explanation exists for
the upward movement of certain MTS rates by the
various interexchange carriers. Specifically, AT&T
has an incentive to raise basic rates toward competi-
tive levels to begin to cover the marginal costs of
serving these low volume customers. By the same to-
ken, MCI and Sprint and the other long-distance
carriers have an equally strong incentive to match
these increases to avoid attracting the unprofitable
part of the market. Competition drives market prices
to costs, and that may mean either an increase or a
decrease in these rates.
The pricing actions taken by AT&T, MCI, and
Sprint in the rest of the residential market are more
relevant to this debate. The potential gains from col-
lusive pricing would have been the greatest in this
higher volume, more profitable segment of the mar-
ket.1"2 Instead of maintaining rates, however, the
major carriers have frequently cut prices and intro-
duced widely-touted new offers over the last five
years to attract customers in this segment. Therefore,
recent pricing actions in the long-distance market are
better characterized as a movement to cost-based
prices and enhanced competition, not as an outcome
note 77, at 438-39; Kaestner & Kahn, supra note 76, at 364. If
such collusion had materialized in a more relaxed regulatory en-
vironment, prices should have been increased, not decreased.
129 See supra note 124.
130 Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 1, at 51 n.119.
131 Id.; see also AT&T's Reply Comments in CC Dkt. No.
79-252, Att. B., at 20-21 (Sept. 18, 1990) (statement of Stanley
M. Bensen).




Finally, one must question the relevance of the
tacit collusion argument to the issue of whether to
reclassify AT&T as a non-dominant carrier and to
further eliminate any remaining asymmetric regula-
tory controls. It is generally conceded that regulation
of prices in a market tends to make collusion more
likely, not less likely.' 8 Pre-announcement of price
changes, notification requirements, intervention op-
portunities, and open discussions of market condi-
tions in regulatory forums all discourage aggressive
price competition and facilitate the sort of informa-
tion exchanges that tend to promote collusive out-
comes. As a result, even if one believes that the inter-
exchange market is conducive to tacit collusion
(which it is not), the appropriate policy action would
still be to eliminate direct price regulation of AT&T
by reclassifying it as nondominant. In so doing, more
aggressive competition would be fostered, and the
likelihood of tacit collusion would be reduced.
B. Predatory Pricing
Another concern that has been raised is the possi-
bility of predatory pricing by AT&T. This problem
vanishes as soon as one recognizes how predatory
pricing must operate and the industry characteristics
that must be in place for the strategy to succeed.' 84
Predatory pricing involves a two-step process. First,
a firm reduces its prices below costs in order to drive
rival producers out of the market. Then, following
such exit, the successful predator raises its prices
well above the competitive level in order to recoup
the losses incurred during the period of predation.
For predatory pricing to occur, existing rivals must
have relatively low sunk costs so that their exit can
be encouraged at reasonable expense. Also, for the
predator to recoup losses through future profits, sub-
stantial barriers to entry must exist to protect it from
188 See, e.g., SCHERER & Ross, supra note 105, at 266
("Government agencies may inadvertently facilitate price paral-
lelism by setting ceiling prices, e.g., as part of anti-inflation
campaigns.").
' For a more complete discussion of both the theory and
empirical evidence relating to predatory pricing in general see
KASERMAN & MAYO, supra note 20, at 128-42.
18 Under current antitrust standards, a claim of predatory
pricing must pass what has come to be known as an incentive
logic filter if it is to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Where a prolonged period of alleged predation has not resulted
in substantial exit, the allegation fails to pass this filter, because
the alleged behavior simply does not make sense economically
under these circumstances. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (The Supreme
post-predation competition. Clearly, neither of these
two conditions exist in the interexchange market.
Predatory pricing therefore is extremely unlikely to
occur in this industry.
To understand how exaggerated the concern over
predatory pricing in the interexchange market is, one
need only consider the events that would have to oc-
cur under the scenario envisioned. First, AT&T
would have to run more than 450 other firms out of
business by charging unjustifiably low rates while
the FCC, state regulatory commissions, and antitrust
authorities stood by without intervening. Moreover,
all of the transmission and switching capacity owned
by these other firms (much of which represents sunk
costs) would have to be purchased by AT&T in or-
der to keep it out of the hands of new competitors.
Then, AT&T would have to raise its rates above the
competitive level to regain its losses without at-
tracting market entry (or reentry). Once again, this
would have to occur while regulatory commissions
and antitrust authorities stand idly by. Obviously,
this sequence of events is extremely improbable.
The argument that a less-stringent regulatory en-
vironment would lead to predatory pricing is also re-
butted by observing state level developments. If re-
laxed regulation leads to predation, then those states
that have implemented such a policy should have re-
alized a reduction in the number of interexchange
carriers as AT&T lowered its rates to predatory
levels.'" 5 A recent empirical analysis of the impact of
relaxed regulation on the number of long-distance
firms competing within each state, however, reveals
no significant effect.' Reduced and/or symmetric
regulation of this firm has not resulted in significant
exit by rival producers. Consequently, it has not led
to predation and relaxed and symmetric regulation
will not lead to predation in the future under any
plausible examination of evolving industry
conditions.13 7
Court observed that "there is a consensus among commentators
that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more
rarely successful."). A summary of the economics of this case is
presented in Kenneth G. Elzinga, Collusive Predation: Matsu-
shita v. Zenith, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION (John E.
Kwoka and Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).
186 Simran K. Kahai, David L. Kaserman & John W.
Mayo, Deregulation and Predation in Long Distance Telecom-
munications: An Empirical Test, ANTITRUST BULL, Fall 1995,
pp. 645-66.
187 The authors of this study concluded:
In this paper, we have attempted to buttress the theoreti-
cal argument against the predatory pricing hypothesis
with empirical evidence. Our findings yield no support for
the argument that reduced regulation has resulted in pre-
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C. Low Volume/Rural Customers
A common concern among regulators considering
reduced regulation for AT&T has been that, with
increased pricing flexibility, AT&T may be able to
raise its rates to certain customer groups above com-
petitive levels without experiencing a sufficient de-
cline in sales to render such rate increases unprofita-
ble."' 9  In other words, while the overall
interexchange market may be subject to effective
competition, pockets of customer groups could re-
main susceptible to abuse. If so, relaxed regulation
might lead to lower rates for some groups and higher
(than competitive) rates for others. In particular, low
volume residential customers and rural customers
have been perceived to be at risk. These concerns,
however, are unfounded.
First, the fundamental premise of the argument is
inaccurate. In order for specific customer groups to
be subject to abuse, they must first be confronted
with monopoly or near-monopoly supply. That is,
these groups must have a limited number of long-
distance firms from which to choose, or they must be
unwilling to switch suppliers in response to a signifi-
cant price increase. Neither of these conditions exists
in the long-distance market. The empirical evidence
pertaining to the interexchange market reveals that
substantial competitive choices are available to all
customer groups, regardless of their geographic loca-
tion or volume of usage;" 9 and a disaggregated
breakdown of industry churn numbers reveals that
low volume users do, in fact, frequently switch carri-
ers, and these users are spread across all demo-
graphic groups.1 40 The assertions that low volume or
rural customers face a limited choice of carriers, that
they will not change carriers, or that they fit some
specific demographic group, are simply myths. These
customers do have choices, they do exercise those
choices, and they span all demographic groups.
Therefore, they do not need special regulatory
dation. In conjunction with the prior empirical literature
relating to this market, the evidence strongly suggests that:
(1) long-distance prices have fallen with divestiture and
increased competition; (2) these prices have fallen more
where regulatory constraints on AT&T have been re-
laxed; and (3) the price reductions observed have had no
predatory effects.
Id. at 20.
'" Regulators should not be concerned about AT&T raising
its rates to competitive levels under a more relaxed regulatory
environment. Moving prices toward marginal cost is generally
welfare-improving regardless of whether that movement is up-
ward or downward from the existing level.
"" Moreover, note that the demographic characteristics of
protection.
Second, from an economic perspective, concerns
about adverse pricing to specific customer groups ul-
timately involve concerns about price discrimination.
Price discrimination occurs where different prices
are charged to different groups of customers, with
the price differences not based upon differences in
the costs of serving those groups. For price discrimi-
nation to occur, two necessary conditions must exist.
The firm practicing price discrimination must hold
some degree of market power and arbitrage across
customer groups must be prevented."" In the long-
distance market, neither condition is met. All cus-
tomer groups have a choice of carrier in a market
with effective competition and are, therefore, not sus-
ceptible to discriminatory prices. Also, arbitrage op-
portunities exist through the ability to resell. As a
result, any attempt to raise the rates for low volume
or rural customers, by an amount that is not justified
by underlying differences in the costs of serving such
customers, will be defeated by the supply response of
competitors and/or arbitrage by resellers. Market
conditions will not tolerate the sort of behavior that
would subject these groups to abuse.
Third, all of the empirical studies surveyed in this
article 42 have used the basic schedule tariff rates as
their price variables in the empirical analyses. The
schedule tariff rates are the maximum rates that low
volume and residential customers pay when they
place a long-distance call. 48 Customers enrolled in a
discount program pay a lower rate. As a result, the
findings, that reduced regulation leads to significant
price reductions and that AT&T does not hold sig-
nificant market power, are not limited to large vol-
ume or urban customers. Such conclusions apply to
all customers, including those paying the full tariffed
(non-discounted) rates.
Finally, identical concerns about low volume or
rural customer groups have been voiced previously at
the state level as well. Despite such concerns, how-
low-volume long-distance customers is very similar to the demo-
graphic profile of other long-distance consumers. Thus, there is
no sound basis for using volume-sensitive regulation to attempt
to promote income redistribution goals. See Ex Parte Presenta-
tion, supra note 1, Att. 0.
140 See Mar. 9 Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 51 (charts
indicating that the consumer profile of light users is comparable
to heavy users).
141 See Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 HAND-
BOOK OF INDUS. ORGANIZATION 597, 599 (R. Schmalensee et
al., eds., 1989).
"s Mathios & Rogers, supra note 77; Kaestner & Kahn,
supra note 76; Ward, supra note 43; Kahai et al., supra note 27.
141 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
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ever, many states have implemented reduced/sym-
metric regulatory policies, and the feared abuse of
these customer groups has not occurred. Compelling
evidence that such groups are not at risk is provided
by the fact that state regulatory agencies have contin-
ued to monitor performance and have not reinsti-
tuted prior regulatory controls. In fact, the empirical
evidence strongly suggests that low volume and rural
customers stand to gain from reduced regulation. As
a result, the combined evidence shows that continued
asymmetric regulation of AT&T, which is ostensibly
intended to protect these customer groups, actually
has the effect of harming them.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have drawn together and as-
sessed a wide array of evidence relevant to asymmet-
ric regulation of AT&T and its classification under
existing FCC and state regulatory commission rules.
This evidence comes from a decade of experience
during which market conditions have evolved rap-
idly, many states have implemented a variety of re-
laxed (and symmetric) regulatory policies, and the
FCC has applied reduced regulation to AT&T's
business services. Such evidence consists of descrip-
tive data pertaining to the underlying economic de-
terminants of market power; empirical studies of the
effects of relaxed regulation at the state level on the
prices charged in the interexchange market; experi-
ence in the provision of AT&T's interstate business
services under streamlined regulation; and empirical
studies that directly estimate the degree of market
power held by AT&T.
Given both the economic and regulatory defini-
tions of dominance, the principal criterion for regu-
latory agencies' asymmetric regulation policies is the
presence or absence of significant market power on
the part of AT&T. The weight of the evidence con-
sidered herein overwhelmingly supports the conclu-
sion that AT&T does not possess significant market
power in the interexchange market. The various
studies and indicia reviewed paint a consistent pic-
ture of a firm that faces very effective competition.
As a result, the recent decision by the FCC to de-
clare AT&T to be "nondominant" is thoroughly
supported on economic grounds.
We have also considered several other competitive
concerns that have arisen over the years regarding
likely market performance under a more relaxed,
symmetric regulatory policy. Here, too, the evidence
strongly suggests that such residual concerns do not
support a continuation of the classification of AT&T
as a dominant firm or the continuation of a regula-
tory scheme which applies more stringent rules to
AT&T than to its competitors. The market condi-
tions that exist for interexchafnge services simply are
not conducive to the sort of behavior that these con-
cerns must postulate. Moreover, actual market expe-
rience also demonstrates that the feared consequences
of relaxed regulation have not and will not material-
ize. Therefore, both economic theory and empirical
evidence support the FCC's decision to cease classi-
fying AT&T as a dominant carrier. This evidence
further demonstrates that no principled basis exists
for the continuation of remaining asymmetrical regu-
latory policies of interexchange carriers at both the
federal and state level.
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FIGURE 1
Long-Distance Firms Purchasing Equal Access
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